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THE ISSUE
The European Union’s budget is fundamentally different from the budgets of federal 
countries and amounts to only about one percent of the EU’s gross national income. 
The literature shows that the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), which takes 38 
percent of EU spending, provides good income support, especially for richer farmers, 
but is less effective for greening and biodiversity and is unevenly distributed. Cohe-
sion policy, 34 percent of EU spending, contributes to convergence but it is unclear 
how strong and long-lasting the effects are. Spending on new priorities such as border 
control could require additional funds of at least €100 billion for the 2021-27 period. In 
addition, EU budgeting is based on a complex and outdated methodology.
POLICY CHALLENGE
There will be a €94 billion Brexit-related hole in the EU budget for 2021-27 if business 
continues as before and the United Kingdom does not contribute. EU countries might 
be reluctant to increase contributions to fill this hole while also covering spending on 
new priorities. We show that freezing agriculture and cohesion spending in real terms 
would fill the Brexit-related hole, but new priorities would then need to be funded 
by an increase in the percent of GNI contribution. Freezing in nominal terms – thus 
cutting in real terms – would generate enough to cover most of the new priorities. This 
would be topped-up by a UK contribution if a EU - UK deal is reached. A fundamental 
overhaul of the EU budget, including its methodology, is crucial.    
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1 INTRODUCTION
The informal European Council meeting 
of 23 February 2018 kick-started the nego-
tiations on the post-2020 European Union 
budget. The EU’s political leaders empha-
sised the importance of spending more on 
tackling illegal migration, on defence and 
security, and on the Erasmus+ education 
programme, while stressing the continued 
importance of cohesion policy, the Com-
mon Agricultural Policy, research and inno-
vation and pan-European infrastructure1.
 The new Multiannual Financial 
Framework (MFF) must be agreed 
unanimously, increasing the likelihood 
that inertia will hold back radical change. 
However, a rethink of the EU budget is 
called for in the context of the changing 
global environment with increased 
security risks, turmoil in the EU’s 
neighbourhood, heightened immigration 
pressures, the wavering United States 
commitment to NATO and questions over 
the effectiveness of a large share of EU 
spending. The EU budget is a reflection 
of the EU's priorities. What the MFF 
discussions will deliver is therefore of 
great importance.
It is also important to understand 
the peculiar nature of the EU’s budget. 
The EU is a group of developed states 
with significant and large government 
sectors. Unlike in federal states, crucial 
government functions such as social 
security, healthcare and defence are 
provided by national states in the EU 
(foreign aid and research support are 
provided by both the EU and member 
states). Therefore, further functions could 
be delegated to the EU only if members 
are ready to reduce or give up their 
activities in these areas. 
The key question then becomes 
which functions can be delivered more 
effectively jointly and how should the EU 
budget and its corresponding activities 
best complement what countries already 
do at national level. This requires carefully 
thinking about European public goods 
and how best to provide them.
Moreover, federations often provide 
stabilisation policy primarily at federal 
level, which is intrinsically linked to the 
allocative function of public finance, or 
redistribution between individuals. But 
in Europe, the welfare state is large and 
basically national. The EU budget could at 
best support national stabilisation efforts 
by providing insurance.
2 THE CURRENT EU BUDGET
The EU budget is financed by member 
states’ contributions, primarily related to 
gross national income (GNI) and value 
added taxes. The EU also receives 80 
percent of customs duties on imports 
from outside the EU and sugar levies, 
while member states keep 20 percent to 
cover collection costs. Some additional 
revenues arise from fines imposed by the 
EU. The overall budget is about 1 percent 
of EU GNI and must be balanced.
The largest spending category is the 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), 
followed by the Structural and Cohesion 
Funds. These account for 72 percent 
of EU commitment appropriations2, or 
€775 billion in 2014-20. ‘Competitiveness 
for growth and jobs’ is the third 
biggest component, with €143 billion. 
This includes several well-known 
elements such as the Horizon 2020 
research programme and Erasmus+. 
Administration with €70 billion covers 
the operational costs of EU institutions. 
With €66 billion, ‘Global Europe’ includes 
the EU foreign policy instruments – 
notably aid, neighbourhood policies 
and other external actions. ‘Security 
and citizenship’ covers domestic issues 
such as health, consumption, justice and 
asylum – totalling €18 billion. Finally, 
‘Sustainable growth: natural resources’ is 
allocated €11 billion, mostly for maritime 
affairs and fisheries. We focus on the two 
largest spending categories: CAP and 
cohesion.
2.1 THE COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY
Total net public spending (CAP and 
national spending) on agriculture in the 
EU is larger than in the US as a share of 
GDP, but is in the middle range of OECD 
countries. CAP spending aims to achieve 
five objectives: greater agricultural pro-
ductivity, a fair standard of living for the 
agricultural community, market stabilisa-
tion, food security and reasonable prices 
for consumers. Moreover, the EU regu-
lation on financing the CAP (Regulation 
1.  See http://www.consilium.
europa.eu/en/meet-
ings/european-coun-
cil/2018/02/23/.  
2. Expenditure committed 
in any given year (which 
might be spent in subse-
quent years). EU budget 
commitments exceed 
payments by about €10 
billion a year, leading to 
an ever-rising volume of 
outstanding commitments, 
known as reste à liquider 
(RAL). RAL is expected to 
exceed €250 billion by 2020. 
EU budgets set ceilings for 
both total commitments 
and payments, but only 
commitment ceilings are 
set for individual items of 
the budget and therefore 
we report those.
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1306/2013) specifies viable food produc-
tion, sustainable management of natural 
resources, climate action and balanced 
territorial development as further objec-
tives. Through the CAP’s ‘greening’ and 
‘cross-compliance’ conditions on subsi-
dies, it attempts to incentivise environ-
ment and animal welfare best practices.
CAP commitment appropriations 
for 2014-20 amount to €408 billion. Of 
this amount, Pillar I (direct payments to 
farmers and market support) has a ceiling 
of €313 billion, of which 94 percent (€294 
billion) could be used as income support 
for farmers. Intervention in case of shocks 
to agricultural markets is expected to 
amount to €18 billion. These supports 
are fully EU financed. The remaining 
commitments of €96 billion go to rural 
development (Pillar II), with the amount 
roughly doubled by co-financing ranging 
between 25 to 75 percent depending on 
the region and measure. 
The distribution of CAP payments to 
EU countries is based on mixed principles. 
More longstanding EU members were able 
to base entitlements on historical support 
values, while support for more recent 
EU members is based on the so-called 
regional model, whereby the payment per 
hectare is the same for all farmers, but 
with much lower average amounts than 
in the older member states. As a result, 
different countries receive rather variable 
levels of CAP payments. 
Richer countries where wages are 
higher receive more CAP funding per 
agricultural worker, when common sense 
would suggest that the greatest income 
subsidy should be given to those who 
earn the least. European Commission 
(2018) highlights that 80 percent of direct 
payments go to 20 percent of farmers, 
which raises further questions about the 
fair distribution of CAP allocations.
To our knowledge, no independent 
evaluation encompassing all aspects of 
the CAP has been done in recent years. 
Alliance Environnement (2017) suggested 
inefficiencies in managing environmental 
impacts, while Pe’er et al (2014) concluded 
that the new environmental prescriptions 
are so diluted they are unlikely to benefit 
biodiversity. Studies often point to the 
need to collect more data and to make 
CAP evaluations more systematic. 
ECA (2017) found the CAP’s ‘greening’ 
policies to be likely ineffective at reducing 
European agriculture’s climate impact. 
ECORYS et al (2016) raised serious 
concerns about national implementation 
of the CAP and the policy’s overall impact. 
Hoelgaard (2018) argued for phase out 
of direct payments, the introduction of 
national co-financing of wage subsidies 
and a focus on real public goods.
Overall, CAP spending mainly 
goes to richer farmers, with uneven 
distribution between EU countries. 
The direct payments as presently 
designed are ineffective or possibly 
counterproductive in achieving the goal of 
greening European agriculture. It is rather 
questionable whether earnings support 
for farmers has European value added. 
This calls for a fundamental reform and 
also reductions in the overall size of the 
CAP, possibly replaced by national (co-)
funding of farmer earnings support.
2.2 REGIONAL POLICY
A key EU objective is to strengthen co-
hesion by tackling regional development 
disparities, especially by targeting the 
least-favoured regions.
Regional policy has commitment 
appropriations of €367 billion for 2014-
20, allocated between the European 
Regional Development Fund (ERDF, 
55 percent), the European Social Fund 
(ESF, 23 percent), the Cohesion Fund (20 
percent) and, sometimes included, the 
Youth Employment initiative (1 percent). 
These funds co-finance economic 
development projects drawn up region 
by region. Projects must demonstrate 
how they contribute to progress towards 
a broad range of objectives, from research 
and development activities and small- 
and medium-sized enterprises, to public 
administration and social inclusion.
In order to stimulate convergence, 
the ERDF and ESF have separate budget 
subdivisions for different regions based 
on their GDP per capita (GDP/cap) €185 
billion is set aside for ‘less developed 
regions’ (with GDP/cap of less than 75 
percent of the EU average). ‘Transition 
regions’ (with GDP/cap between 75 
percent and 90 percent of the EU average) 
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3. For example, Pinho et al 
(2015), Fratesi and Perucca 
(2014), Pellegrini et al 
(2013), Crescenzi and Giua 
(2017), Becker et al (2017). 
In a European Commission 
report, Pienkowski and 
Berkowitz (2015) also con-
clude that most studies find 
a positive but small impact, 
especially in less developed 
regions. Some studies find 
no significant impact or 
even a negative impact.
receive €36 billion. ‘More developed 
regions’ (with GDP/cap above 90 percent 
of the EU average) receive €56 billion. 
Macroeconomic model simulations 
conclude that such funds have a positive 
impact, but the results of empirical 
studies are more mixed. Marzinotto 
(2012) concluded that by and large, the 
available literature showed that the most 
growth-enhancing investments were 
infrastructure and education. More direct 
empirical tests sometimes find a positive, 
albeit often small, impact of EU funds 
on growth convergence. In particular, 
investment in human capital and R&D 
generates positive long-term effects on 
growth convergence, while other spending 
might deliver only a short-term effect. 
However, there is no consensus in the 
literature and other studies do not find 
a higher rate of convergence in funded 
regions compared with non EU-funded 
regions. More recent works have found 
similarly mixed results3.  
3 THE FUTURE EU BUDGET
It is unfortunate that discussion about the 
EU budget is frequently centred on the 
balance between payments into the EU 
budget and EU spending in a particular 
country. Such an approach is rather reduc-
tive. Countries receiving more from the EU 
budget than they pay in (central, eastern 
and some southern European countries) 
might not benefit as much as the numbers 
show because of ineffective programme 
design, but might receive funding as part 
of the political deal when they entered 
the single market. Net contributors (most 
western and northern European countries) 
should not look at their contribution to the 
EU budget as a loss to domestic taxpayers 
because the indirect benefits might offset 
the direct financial contribution. If these 
funds improve the economic outlook of co-
hesion countries (even in the short term), 
the implication is a larger European market 
benefitting all countries. Companies 
based in net payer countries can benefit 
from projects financed by cohesion funds. 
Cohesion funds might boost the imports of 
the countries where those funds are spent. 
Finally, cohesion funding also contributes 
to completing the single market, which is a 
key growth driver for the EU as a whole.
3.1 RETHINKING EU SPENDING
The first priority in the EU spending 
debate should be to increase the efficien-
cy and effectiveness of current pro-
grammes. Our literature review suggests 
that improved targeting can mean EU 
programmes continue to achieve their 
goals as now, but with lower spending. 
In particular, as European Commission 
(2018) has suggested, cutting spending 
on industrial farming while maintaining 
support for small-scale farmers could limit 
the political costs while improving the 
greening of farming policy. Since organis-
ing earnings support at the European level 
has little rationale, such support could be 
moved to member states. Similarly, better 
targeting, stronger action against corrup-
tion and focusing Cohesion and Structural 
Funds on those regions truly in need of 
catching up, or that are truly poor, should 
deliver the best growth dividends. 
European Commission (2018) outlines 
possible new spending priorities (Table 1). 
Table 1: European Commission new spending priorities scenarios, 2021-27 MFF (€bns)
2014-2020 MFF Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3
EU border protection 4 8 22.5 150
European Defence Union 0.6 3.5 10.5 20.5
Mobility of young people 14.7 30 90
Digital transformation 35 35 70
Research and innovation 80 80 120 160
External actions 66 (MFF) + 31 (EDF) 100 100
Total 231
Total ex. UK contributions 201 318 591
Source: Bruegel based on European Commission (2018). Note: EDF = European Development Fund, a major provider of foreign aid, is outside 
the EU budget. European Commission (2018) proposed to bring this fund into the EU budget.
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 Their middle scenario would 
necessitate about €117 billion in additional 
resources from 2021-27, while the most 
ambitious scenario would necessitate an 
additional €390 billion4. A key question is 
the savings that a relative reduction in CAP 
and cohesion spending would provide. We 
discuss this in section 3.2. 
A second important question of 
priorities is whether there is a need for 
a specific euro-area fiscal stabilisation 
instrument, such as some form of 
insurance system to assist countries 
suffering from country-specific shocks 
(Claeys and Wolff, 2018), and if so, 
whether it should be within the EU 
budget or outside it as a new instrument. 
This question is all the more important 
because after Brexit the euro area’s 
weight within the EU will increase.
Provided a political decision is 
reached on the establishment of a euro-
area fiscal stabilisation instrument, 
having it within the EU budget would 
bring several advantages (Wolff, 
2017). An EU budget line would avoid 
creating a new ad-hoc (probably inter-
governmental) institution and would 
avoid an additional political and financial 
wedge between euro and non-euro area 
countries. But there is a more important 
political economy argument. Creating 
new budgetary resources for the euro 
area faces fierce resistance because 
insurance is more useful for fiscally 
weaker countries than for stronger, 
and because there is a perception that 
existing EU resources are poorly used. 
Politically, an important precondition 
for mobilising new resources therefore 
seems to be better use of existing EU 
resources. Creating the euro-area line 
within the EU budget institutionalises 
this need to reform the budget.
However, there would also be 
significant obstacles. The EU budget is 
based on a rather complicated set of treaty 
rules, allowing for limited flexibility and 
essentially no borrowing capacity (beyond 
financial assistance programmes). 
3.2 EU BUDGET REVENUES
Setting spending priorities, along with 
setting the total volume of the EU budget, 
necessitates parallel thinking about the 
revenue side. One issue is whether the 
EU budget revenues should increase 
beyond the current level in percent of 
GNI. A second question is whether new 
resources should be created (for exam-
ple, in line with the proposals of Monti 
et al (2016)). We do not look into the 
revenue side in detail. Many countries 
have already voiced their opposition to 
increasing their contributions relative to 
GNI. We therefore consider it as impor-
tant that the EU starts a serious debate 
on direct tax resources. A tax on CO2 
emissions, for example, would be a wel-
come source of revenue (and a sensible 
way of advancing the EU’s climate goals) 
and would be feasible without treaty 
change. Redirecting revenues from the 
EU emissions trading system to the EU 
budget would also be feasible. 
4 THE NEX T MFF AFTER BREXIT 
The EU budget could develop in a 
number of ways post-Brexit. The United 
Kingdom might contribute to the next 
MFF and some of the commitments of 
the current MFF are planned to be spent 
in the UK after 2020. However, since the 
UK contribution to the EU budget and EU 
spending in the UK is uncertain until the 
EU27-UK treaty is signed and ratified, we 
first present scenarios that exclude the 
UK from the next MFF. Subsequently, we 
assess possible UK contributions.
4.1 MFF 2021-27, NO UK CONTRIBUTION
As the UK has been a net contributor to 
the EU budget, Brexit might leave a large 
hole. In order to quantify the this hole, we 
first calculate that the GNI of the EU27 will 
increase by 28 percent in total from 2014-
20 to 2021-27. Of that, roughly half is real 
growth and the other half is inflation5. 
Assuming the UK’s net contribution 
to the next MFF is zero and all spending 
in and revenue from the EU27 increases 
with GNI, there will be a €94 billion hole 
in the next MFF, or about €13 billion per 
year from 2021-27 (Table 2, scenario 
1). Without any reduction in certain 
expenditures relative to GNI, a significant 
increase in national contributions would 
be needed to fund this gap. Moreover, the 
new spending priorities listed in Table 
1 would require at least an additional 
4.  Beyond border control, the 
Commission report does 
not include scenarios for 
immigration-related issues, 
such as integration of 
immigrants. 
5. We base our calculations 
on the November 2017 
European Commission 
and the October 2017 IMF 
forecasts; see details in the 
online annex.
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€100 billion. That would mean that the 
revenues would have to increase to 1.2 
percent or more.
Since the effectiveness of CAP and 
cohesion spending is dubious, we 
consider further scenarios (Table 2): 
• Scenario 2: CAP and cohesion spend-
ing is increased with inflation only, ie 
by 13 percent, while other spending 
and all revenue items grow with the 
28 percent increase of GNI; this would 
result in a surplus of about €13 billion 
(or about €2 billion per year) available 
for spending on other priorities; 
• Scenario 3: CAP and cohesion 
spending is fixed at the 2014-20 MFF 
levels in nominal terms (implying a 13 
percent decline in real terms), while 
everything else is increased by 28 
percent; this would result in an overall 
surplus in the MFF for new spending 
priorities of about €102 billion, or 
about €14 billion a year.
While these scenarios are illustrative, 
they show that the Brexit hole in the 
budget could be filled by, for example, 
freezing the real value of CAP and 
cohesion spending, which would still 
involve a nominal increase of 13 percent. 
This option was not raised by European 
Commission (2018), which suggested that 
nominal cuts would be necessary. In fact, 
our scenario 3 shows that without any 
nominal cut, nominal freezing of CAP and 
cohesion spending would make available 
€102 billion for other spending priorities, 
which is not that far from the additional 
resources needed for the middle scenario 
in Table 1. But this would come at the 
expense of a 13 percent decline in the 
real value of CAP and cohesion spending, 
while scenario 2 would require an increase 
in the revenues to 1.1 percent to fund the 
new priorities.
4.2 ASSESSING POSSIBLE UK CONTRIBUTIONS TO 
THE 2021-27 MFF
The UK might substantially contribute to 
the next MFF if: 
• An exit deal is signed and the princi-
ples laid down in the December 2017 
agreement on the financial settlement 
between the EU27 and the UK are 
implemented6, and
• The EU and UK sign a comprehensive 
economic partnership agreement 
for the post-2020 period involving a 
UK contribution to the EU budget, 
similarly to, for example, Norway’s 
contribution.
The December 2017 agreement 
resulted in the acknowledgement of 
the broadest possible liabilities for the 
UK: for 2019-20, the UK will contribute 
as if it were a member of the EU, while 
post-2020 the UK will pay its share of all 
liabilities and commitments accumulated 
by the EU up to 31 December 2020, 
including its share of the pensions of EU 
employees. Moreover, the UK will not 
benefit from a share of EU assets. 
The December 2017 document 
clearly explains the principles of 
financial settlement with one important 
exception: whether the rebate-adjusted 
or non-adjusted historical contributions 
will be used to calculate the UK’s share 
of the post-2020 contributions. 
Table 2: Scenarios for the 2021-2027 MFF for 27 countries without a UK contribution (€bns)
Payments Revenues
Scenario 1: Scenario 2: Scenario 3:
CAP 463 408 362 Total own resources 1,097
Cohesion 431 379 336 Other revenues 55
Other spending 352 352 352
Total 1,246 1,139 1,050 Total 1,152
Balance -94 13 102
Total % GNI 1.1% 1.0% 0.9% Total % GNI 1.0%
Source: Bruegel; see the online annex. Note: Scenario 1 = CAP/cohesion increase with GNI; Scenario 2 = CAP/cohesion increase with inflation; 
Scenario 3 = CAP/cohesion nominal fix at previous MFF level. Other spending and all revenues increase with GNI. Numbers on the left side refer 
to payments, not commitments.
6.  ‘Joint report from the nego-
tiators of the European 
Union and the United 
Kingdom Government on 
progress during phase 1 of 
negotiations under Article 
50 TEU on the United King-
dom’s orderly withdrawal 
from the European Union’, 
8 December 2017, see: 
https://ec.europa.eu/com-
mission/sites/beta-politi-
cal/files/joint_report.pdf.
POLICY BRIEF RETHINKING THE EUROPEAN UNION’S POST-BREXIT BUDGET PRIORITIES7
7.   About half of Norway’s 
gross contribution is paid 
directly into the EU budget, 
while the other half goes to 
European Economic Area 
(EEA) and Norway grants 
to promote European cohe-
sion efforts.
Table 3: Estimate of the UK’s net contribution to the EU budget after 2020 according to 
the draft EU/UK financial settlement (€bns)
UK’s net contribution 2021-27 Post-2027
If non-rebate adjusted share 28 8
If rebate adjusted share 17 6
Source: Bruegel; see details in the on-line annex. Note: post-2027 UK contributions primarily relate to EU staff pension payments. 
We therefore calculate two scenarios 
(Table 3), which show that the UK might 
contribute between €17-28 billion in 2021-
27. The December 2017 agreement has 
not at time of writing been ratified and is 
therefore uncertain.
Moreover, the exit fee might not be 
the UK’s only contribution to post-2020 
EU budgets. If the UK and the EU sign a 
comprehensive economic partnership 
agreement for the post-2020 period 
and the UK participates in some EU 
programmes, the UK might also make 
annual contributions to the EU budget, 
like Norway and Switzerland. Norway’s net 
contribution to the EU has been historically 
about half of the UK’s relative to GNI7. 
Switzerland’s net contribution has been 
much smaller, while Iceland was in fact 
a net beneficiary of EU spending in 2015 
(Table 4). In case of a Canada-style FTA 
between the EU and UK, no budgetary 
contributions will be implied, but countries 
with which the EU have FTAs do not benefit 
from EU programmes like Horizon 2020 
and Erasmus+.
In the right-hand column of Table 4, we 
calculate illustrative UK contributions to 
the 2021-27 MFF. A Swiss-type contribution 
would suggest only €3 billion for the full 
seven-year period, while a Norway-type 
contribution would suggest €31 billion, or 
about €4.5 billion per year.
Therefore, if there is both an exit deal 
and a new comprehensive partnership 
agreement between the EU and the UK, the 
Brexit-hole in the next MFF will be smaller 
than that implied by a no-deal scenario. 
5 CONCLUSIONS
The EU budget is and will remain far from 
what public finance theory or experience 
of fiscal federations suggests in terms of 
spending priorities. The key direction of 
spending reform should be to focus on true 
European public goods that can be more 
efficiently provided jointly than by mem-
ber states separately. To this end, more 
independent evaluations of various EU pro-
grammes, as well as the overall allocation of 
EU resources, should be conducted.
Our review of CAP and cohesion 
funding suggests that there is scope for 
efficiency gains, which would allow some 
of the hole in the MFF arising from Brexit 
to be filled. For example, increasing 
CAP and cohesion spending by inflation 
only – 13 percent in total from 2014-20 to 
2021-27 – would be sufficient to cover the 
Brexit hole, but new priorities would then 
need to be funded by an increase in the 
percent-of-GNI contribution. 
Table 4: Possible UK contributions to the 2021-27 EU budget arising from preferential 
market access and participation in EU programmes
Historical contributions 
by country (% GNI)
Total UK net contribution in 2021-27 if UK 
GNI share as per the first data column (€bns)
Iceland -0.05% -11
Canada -- 0
Switzerland 0.02% 3
Liechtenstein 0.03% 7
Norway 0.16% 31
United Kingdom 0.33% 65
Source: Bruegel; see details in the online annex. Note: the first data column shows the average of 2010-16 for the UK, average of 2014-15 for the non-EU countries. 
The main reason for the discrepancy between the €65 billion number included in this table, which would results from the UK’s continued contribution based on its 
2010-16 historical share, and the €94 billion hole in the EU budget indicated in Table 2, scenario 1, is the depreciation of the British pound against the euro after 
the Brexit referendum in June 2016. Thereby UK GNI expressed in euro declined substantially, so the same share of UK GNI amounts to a lower value in euros. 
Another reason for the discrepancy is that UK economic growth from 2014-20 to 2021-27 is expected to be somewhat lower than EU27 growth. Furthermore, UK’s 
historical contribution is based on the ‘operating budgetary balance’ concept.
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Freezing the CAP and cohesion 
budgets in nominal terms would 
generate enough to cover most of the new 
priorities, but would led to a cut in real 
terms, a politically difficult outcome.
 Reforms should be differentiated. 
We do not see a justification for European 
subsidies to top up farmer earnings, but 
there are justifications for correcting market 
failures and promoting public goods, 
such as environment and biodiversity, 
and for insuring against large risks such as 
earthquakes and animal disease epidemics, 
as in the US. Cohesion policy has a 
European justification, but needs better 
design, targeting and control. Furthermore, 
some of the other existing spending areas, 
such as research and youth mobility, also 
require increased resources in our view. 
The EU will therefore also need to consider 
increasing revenues or possibly the creation 
of a dedicated EU tax, such as a carbon tax. 
The case for a euro-area stabilisation 
tool for symmetric shocks is less clear-
cut. However, if risk-sharing tools are to 
be strengthened, we see a clear case for 
doing it within the EU budget and not as an 
ad-hoc instrument. 
Finally, the EU should scrap its 
outdated and overly complex budgeting 
methodology, which leads to an ever-
rising stock of outstanding spending 
commitments (reste à liquider), and 
instead adopt the best practices used 
by governments and multinational 
organisations based on accrual multi-
annual budgeting, supplemented with a 
cash budget.
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